Abstract Genetics is in a postgenomic era, and this article illustrates this epistemological evolution using the debate between developmental criticism and traditional biometric genetics about gene 9 environment interaction. Quantitative geneticists are blamed for failing to respect the complexity of development; as a response, they claim a defensive position, called isolationist pluralism, which supports the idea that studying development is not their problem. But postgenomics seems to have accepted and integrated some developmental criticisms and the isolationist perspective has been challenged during the last few years. The developmental and quantitative traditions actually represent two different levels of analysis, but biometrics has also a clear developmental explanatory potential as it suggests statistically the existence of mechanical causes. Both traditions work together to go ever further in the knowledge of the phenomena being studied. Postgenomic pluralism, instead of being isolationist, may be considered pragmatic.
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The Postgenomic Era
Since the early 2000s an epistemological evolution has been underway in genetics. A new era called ''postgenomics'' has begun (Perbal 2011) . The postgenomic era follows the genomic era, whose epistemology was reductionist and focused on genes. Indeed, in the 1990s, many questions, explanations, and methodologies considered relevant were centered on the gene as a primary cause. The great confidence in the explanatory power of genes has deep historical roots, from early genetics in the 20th century to the Human Genome Project in the 1990s, and including the success of molecular biology in the mid-20th century. In contrast, the postgenomic era tends to go beyond the genomic hegemony of the gene's-eye view and the linear perception of the link between genotype and phenotype; to study the functions of multiple genes, proteins, RNAs, and interactions among all of them. To understand the complexity of living beings' development it is necessary to combine various ways of studying a trait. The postgenomic era wants to take seriously into account the molecular complexity that takes place from genotype to phenotype (Perbal 2011) .
Even Dean Hamer-who became one of the most famous and polemical geneticists in the 1990s due to his paper on the ''gay gene'' (Hamer et al. 1993 )-explains in ''Rethinking Behavior Genetics'' published in Science in 2002: ''The real culprit (in behavioral genetics) is the assumption that the rich complexity of human thought and emotion can be reduced to a simple, linear relation between individual genes and behaviors. This oversimplified model, which underlies most current research in behavior genetics, ignores the critical importance of the brain, environment and genes expression networks'' (Hamer 2002, p. 71) . In a different perspective but with the same will to go beyond the gene's-eye-view, Robert Plomin-an important British behavioral geneticist-thinks that the future of behavioral genetics in the postgenomic era lies in what he calls behavioral genomics (Plomin et al. 2002) . This discipline seeks to study the effects of specific genes on the whole behavior of individuals. It is interested in the way genetic effects on behaviors contribute to change or regularity in development (according to the age, life history, etc.). That is to say, the same phenotype is observed at various stages of an individual's life. It is the study of genetic and environmental influences on individual differences in behavioral development. It is a temporal perspective that wants to study the same phenotype at different stages of development, respecting the fact that, e.g., the antisocial behavior of a child differs from antisociality in an adult in their causal pathways and in their way of phenotypic expressing.
Functional genomics and proteomics, where the focus is on gene products, their structure and expression, can be generally viewed as bottom-up strategies. But there are other levels of analysis at which we can understand how genes work. A top-down approach highlights the behavior of the whole organism. For example, we can ask how the effects of specific genes unfold in behavioral development and how they interact and correlate with experience. This topdown, behavioral genomic level of analysis will complement the current functional approaches in the human species. (McGuffin et al. 2001 (McGuffin et al. , p. 1233 In my view, those approaches are specific to postgenomics as they called for complementarity of approaches, interactions of causal factors, and complexity of molecular networks. In fact, the postgenomic era seems to have incorporated some criticisms from developmental biology. The latter has been underlining the complexity of development and rejecting any reductionist approach of phenomena since the early 20th century. But more than developing systemic approaches, postgenomics is an epistemological evolution towards a pluralistic perspective: quantitative genetics, molecular genetics, neuroscience, developmental biology, and bioinformatics tend to be more and more in close association in genetics studies.
This article has two main purposes. First, I want to illustrate more precisely these changes to pluralistic postgenomics through the debate between developmental criticism and traditional biometric genetics around gene 9 environment (G 9 E) interaction. It is exemplary of the kind of arguments used on both sides. Quantitative geneticists are blamed for failing to respect the complexity of development; as a response, they claim a defensive position, called isolationist pluralism, with the idea that studying development is not their problem (Griffiths and Tabery 2008) . Isolationist pluralism has been challenged in the last few years by some biologists and philosophers. It is the ''isolationist'' element that is problematic in the postgenomic era. For example, the philosopher James Tabery demonstrates that the isolationist position is obfuscating, and he proposes to unify developmental and biometric traditions on G 9 E interaction debate thanks to the concept of ''difference mechanisms '' (2009) . Biometricians' studies on the causes of variation can be informative on regular mechanisms (unlike developmentalist criticism) if they recognize the developmental aspect of G 9 E interactions (unlike their defense-by-distinction). The concept of interaction G 9 E incorporates a developmental element by showing how a particular combination of genetic and environmental factors may influence the course of individual development. So the actual difference maker in the study of individual variations can be the differencemaking variables of developmental mechanisms. It is not two different levels of analysis. Second, this article wants to challenge Tabery's arguments on one point. Tabery's ideas on the concept of difference mechanisms may apply more broadly than he suggests in his reasoning about G 9 E interaction: if difference mechanisms are regular causal mechanisms made up of difference-making variables, one or more of which are actual difference-makers as defined by Waters (2007) , it may concern any actual variable taken independently not only when they are considered in interaction. My point in this article is to push Tabery's reasoning a step further in the final purpose to underline the importance of pluralism in postgenomics.
Biometrics Versus Interactionism

Biometrics
There are several ways to overcome the conceptual opposition between nature and nurture. One is biometrics, which is concerned with studying gene and environment interactions in a statistical way at population level.
The biometric way of studying G 9 E interaction is quite specific to quantitative genetics. It overcomes the nature versus nurture debate in a quantitative way, focusing on the relative contributions of genotypic and environmental differences to the total phenotypic variation of a particular trait in a particular population. The variation of genetic and environmental factors is involved in interindividual variation of traits. The main form taken by this question in quantitative genetics is ''In which relative contributions?'' An important statistical tool of these approaches in classical quantitative genetics is the concept of heritability. It is defined as the proportion of phenotypic variation that is associated with genetic differences between individuals in a given population. This statistical tool may also incorporate the effects of interactions between genes and their environment. Indeed, there is interaction when different genotypic groups respond differently to an identical environment. The interaction studied in this case is the statistical interaction, or biometric concept of gene-environment interaction, G 9 E b , between sources of environmental and genotypic variation in a population. The genotype-environment interaction, or G 9 E, creates a potential problem for ANOVA and heritability equation because it generates its own source of variation VG 9 E. 1 Interactionism A second way to overcome the nature versus nurture dichotomy is called interactionism. It criticizes biometric approaches as they tend to minimize the importance of G 9 E interactions for individual development: they seem to be only interested in variation in population for a trait, not in regularity in development, and moreover, they focus mostly on genetic differences to explain that variation.
This kind of criticism was initiated by Richard Lewontin and his dialectical biology (Levins and Lewontin 1985) . It is now mainly supported by a broader theoretical framework, Developmental Systems Theory or DST (Oyama et al. 2001) , whose main aim is to challenge the hegemony of the gene's-eye-view perspective. It is a theoretical framework that brings together a diversity of explanatory models of development and evolution. For example, John Odling-Smee proposes an extended evolutionary theory in which there are two important processes, natural selection and niche construction, and two systems of inheritance, genetic inheritance and ecological heredity. Adaptation is then no more just a matter of natural selection, but also includes the organisms' activities that affect their environment and the natural selection pressure by building their own niche (Odling-Smee et al. 2003) . In another example, the geneticist Eva Jablonka, a specialist of epigenetic inheritance, identifies several systems of inheritance associated with different modes of transmission. There is the genetic inheritance system, GIS; the cellular and epigenetic inheritance systems, EISs; the systems underlying the transmission of behavioral patterns through learning in animal societies, behavior inheritance systems, BISs, and the communication system using the symbolic language, symbolic inheritance systems, SISs. So inheritance is not just a matter of genes (Jablonka 2001) .
Despite their differences, their questionings are constructed on concepts like multicausality and causal parity: the causal factors are numerous and are part of an a priori causal parity which means they are ontologically and a priori equal in regard to their importance in the causal system. It is a defeasible starting assumption as the relative causal significance of variables depends on the context and is analyzed a posteriori. The important point with this concept is that developmentalists are strongly opposed to reductionist approaches that give priority to any unique causal entities; each trait is produced by the interaction and entanglement of many developmental sources (Oyama 1985) . Starting with gene transcription and treating DNA as an independent variable that initiates a cascade of causal events is a legitimate approach, but-according to the a priori causal parity-it also too easily obscures the causal system that underlies the transcription. ''Oppositions between genes (or biology) and learning, or between genes (or biology) and culture, are endemic to many fields but are miserably inadequate for capturing the multitude of causal factors needed for any reasonable treatment of ontogeny or phylogeny'' (Oyama et al. 2001, p. 2) . Moreover, it is not just about gene 9 environment interactions but also about the entanglement-and reciprocal influences-of many causes in development.
So developmentalists use the concept of developmental interactions, G 9 E d , which was introduced by the British geneticist Lancelot Hogben (1895 Hogben ( -1975 in 1932 to criticize, even then, the antithesis of heredity and environment. Developmental biologists are more interested in the regularity of individual development than in inter-individual variations in populations. In some ways, the new conceptual universe of the postgenomic era echoes DST with concepts like complexity, development, interaction or networks.
The Opposition
Thus, developmental biologists adopt an interactionist perspective which criticizes quantitative approaches of the biometric tradition. Evaluating the values of heritability is not a frontal attack on the issue of nature and nurture. Indeed, on the one hand, the respective contribution of environmental and genetic influences to the variations of a trait is not simply additive; there may be interactions that break the mathematical additivity of the heritability equation. And on the other hand, even though biometricians claim to seek the causes of variations, quantifying the statistical contribution to the variation is not the same as quantifying the causal contribution to the development of the organism (Lewontin 1974; Oyama 1985) . It provides no relevant information about the causal relationship linking genotype and phenotype.
As a response, quantitative geneticists reproach developmental biologists for confounding two different levels of analysis: they are not interested in the same questions and do not develop the same answering strategies. For them, developmental questions at the individual level have nothing to do with the quantitative and population approaches of biometric studies. Developmental criticisms are confused and off-topic (Bouchard and Segal 1985; Sesardic 2005) . This position is called isolationist pluralism or the defenseby-distinction (Griffiths and Tabery 2008) . For example, Robert Plomin says: ''Unfortunately, discussions of genotype-environment interactions have often confused the population concept with that of individual development'' (Plomin et al. 1977, p. 309) . So, studying interactions in individual differences differs from studying interactions in the causal mechanisms of development.
Beyond the Opposition
In recent years there has been a will to overcome this defensive position (Longino 2001; Caspi and Moffitt 2006; Rutter 2006; Tabery 2007 Tabery , 2009 ) according to the postgenomic spirit. The English child psychiatrist Michael Rutter explains that the opposition or indifference between developmental and biometric traditions is sterile. They are complementary and co-informative. The highlighting of a statistical link between a variable and a phenomenon suggests a need for further exploration of the mechanical causal links between them (2006). The philosopher James Tabery defends the same idea. According to him, these two traditions, far from opposing each other, meet at the axis of the concept of difference mechanisms (Tabery 2009). Difference mechanisms are regular causal mechanisms made up of difference-making variables, one or more of which are actual difference makers as defined by Waters (2007) . By definition, an actual difference maker is a cause that makes a difference under specific experimental conditions.
2 Any cause can be a (potential) difference maker, while there are only few that actually are. ''Seeking the one cause among many that actually made a difference is no fool's errand. It entails picking out the actual difference maker among potential difference makers in an actual population '' (Waters 2007, p. 567) .
Waters develops the example of a girl who takes a match from a box. The matches in the box might be considered as an actual population and the difference between having lit versus not having lit is an actual difference. With respect to this actual effect, the girl's striking the match is the actual difference-making cause. The presence of oxygen is a cause but not a cause that makes the actual difference in this actual population of matches because oxygen is present for all the matches (Waters 2007). As a biological instance, DNA is an important causal factor in protein synthesis and it is an actual difference maker as it naturally varies. On the other hand, cell membranes are only potential difference makers as they do not naturally vary but are a part of the causal schema anyway.
So, in order to overcome the isolationist perspective, Tabery (2009) defends the thesis that the difference-making variables in the regular causal mechanisms responsible for individual development simultaneously may be the causes of phenotypic variation precisely when the difference-making variables are actual difference makers, and so variation is just the effect of actual difference-making variables in the regular causal mechanisms responsible for individual development. When a difference-making variable does vary actually, it becomes the cause of phenotypic variation, which means an actual difference maker.
He uses an example that is quite enlightening based on a study on G 9 E interaction in depression. A particular allele of the serotonin transporter gene appears to protect individuals from the negative psychosocial impacts of multiple stress factors (Caspi et al. 2003) . The transporter gene is serotonin 5-HTT or SLC6A4. It is localized on chromosome 17 and it may have a long or short allele (s/s homozygous, s/l heterozygous, l/l homozygous). The short allele causes low activity of the transport system, which means that there is more serotonin in the synapse and that it is less available for reuse. Caspi et al. (2003) show that individuals with the short allele of 5-HTT are more subject to depression when they experience stressful events in their life.
Thus, in the case of depression, the causal pattern has several levels: -molecular because of the promoter of the serotonin transporter gene 5-HTT); -cellular because of the transporter of serotonin involved in the mechanism of synaptic transmission between pre-and post-synaptic neuron; -cerebral because the amygdala and cingulate interact through feedback mechanisms to control the chemical response to stressful environmental conditions; -and organismic because humans experience stressful situations. (Tabery 2009).
Each of these causes is a difference-making variable in the causal mechanisms responsible for the individual development of depression. They may take naturally different forms becoming then actual difference makers of the inter-individual variation observed in the population.
For Tabery, biometric geneticists cannot claim the defense-by-distinction. To begin, the interaction highlighted by Caspi and Moffit's researches inform us that there is interdependence between difference-making variables in the regular mechanisms of the individual development of depression. Thus, unlike the defense-by-distinction, the concept of interaction G 9 E incorporates a developmental element by showing how a particular combination of genetic and environmental factors may influence the course of individual development. So, the isolationist pluralism is 2 According to Woodward's (2003) manipulability concept, a factor is causally related to another if and only if the manipulation of the value of the factor led to a change in the value of the other factor under certain conditions. inconsistent since researches on the causes of variations enlighten researches on the causes of developmental mechanisms. The actual difference maker in the study of individual variations can be the difference-making variables of developmental mechanisms. Biometrics and developmental biology do not offer two different levels of analysis. Then biometricians' studies on the causes of variation can be informative on regular mechanisms (unlike developmentalist criticism) if they recognize the developmental aspect of G 9 E interactions (unlike their defense-by-distinction). That is to say that interdependence of variables must be seriously taken into account and thus breaking with the additivity of the heritability equation.
A Step Further: Correlation to Causation
If I agree with Tabery's arguments to demonstrate the fact that the biometric and developmental interactions should not be opposed, in my point of view his arguments need clarification at some points.
First, I think it is necessary to underline that biometric geneticists do not seek the causes of variation. They suggest the existence of causes, they do not show it. Indeed, a positive correlation is demonstrated when a factor is more prevalent in the population studied, but it does not necessarily reflect a causal relationship between this factor and the behavioral trait of interest. Biometric interactions are not significant per se in a developmental point of viewunlike Tabery's suggestion-since a correlation is not causation.
Let me explain my point. The interaction studied by Caspi and Moffitt is biometric, so, by itself their paper does not show any causal link. Anyway thanks to anterior interventionist studies, they know that the transporter of serotonin gene (5-HTT) in interaction with a stressful environment is indeed an actual difference-maker for the development of depression. The causal role of the 5-HTT gene is highlighted because they referred to three studies. First, in mice with disrupted 5-HTT, homozygous and heterozygous (5-HTT s/s and s/l) strains exhibited more fearful behavior and greater increases in the stress hormone adrenocorticotropin in response to stress compared to homozygous (5-HTT l/l) controls. In the absence of stress no differences related to genotype were observed (Murphy et al. 2001) . Second, in rhesus macaques, the short allele is associated with decreased serotonergic function among monkeys reared in stressful conditions but not among normally reared monkeys (Bennett et al. 2002) . Third, human neuroimaging research shows that humans with one or two copies of the s allele exhibit greater amygdala neuronal activity to fearful stimuli compared to individuals homozygous for the l allele (Hariri et al. 2002) . The amygdala and the cingulate of individuals with the s allele, compared with those l/l, work less efficiently in the feedback mechanisms responsible for the chemical response to environmental stresses (Pezawas et al. 2005) . The promoter region of the 5-HTT gene makes a difference in the individual development, as the knock-out experiments reveal, because it does influence the way the amygdala reacts to stress factors.
So it is thanks to this kind of exploration of the causal relationship (e.g., between 5-HTT gene and amygdale activity) that variables in quantitative studies become difference makers. In their study, Caspi and Moffit reinforce the idea that stressful environments moderate the effect of 5-HTT gene in human species as well. They reinforce the hypothesis of the existence of a developmental G 9 E interaction but they don't actually prove it. Biometric interactions inform us that there is a potential, not an actual, interdependence between difference-making variables in the regular mechanisms of the individual development of depression. The existence of a possible causal relationship must then be explored. It is the purpose of interventionist approaches to determine if the correlated variables are indeed actual difference makers for development. If so, then phenotypic variations observed in the population are indeed the result of changes of difference-making variables of regular mechanism as suggested by the biometric analysis.
According to me, biometric and developmental genetics are distinct levels of analysis mainly due to the fact that correlation is not causation. Unlike Tabery's reasoning, I do not think that taking seriously into account the fact that the concept of interaction G 9 E incorporates a developmental element-by showing how a particular combination of genetic and environmental factors may influence the course of individual development-is enough to reject the isolationist position of biometricians. But this does not mean that this position is relevant either. The fact that biometricians suggest that the correlated variable might be an actual difference maker is enough to justify the complementarity of these two approaches. As a consequence, Tabery's ideas on the concept of difference mechanisms may apply more broadly. If difference mechanisms are regular causal mechanisms made up of difference-making variables, one or more of which are actual difference makers as defined by Waters (2007) , it may concern any actual variable taken independently not only when they are considered in interaction.
To be clearer, it is necessary to go back to Caspi and Moffit's study. Moffitt, Caspi, and Rutter explain that psychiatric quantitative genetics studies usually produce ''risk factors'' for disorders. Variables become risk factors if they have a documented predictive statistical association to disorder outcomes, whether or not the association is causal. But for them, to carry out good G 9 E studies a variable must be more than a risk factor for G 9 E studies and tests must be done to see if the risk factor actually has causal significance (Moffitt et al. 2005) . So, to select environmental risks for inclusion in G 9 E research, researchers must consider (Moffitt et al. 2005 ):
-marked variability in response among people exposed to the environmental risk; -plausible effect of the environmental risk on biological systems involved in the disorder. For example, genes that influence mental disorders must do so via neurobiological pathways. Thus, to be a good candidate for interaction with genes, an environmental risk ought to have evidence that it affects a neurobiological pathway to disorder; -evidence that the putative risk is a true environmental pathogen having causal effects.
In the same way, identifying candidate susceptibility genes implies the considerations of:
-common polymorphic variants. From a pragmatic point of view, common allelic variants confer advantages of statistical power when testing interaction effects; -evidence of direct gene-to-disorder association; -functional significance in relation to reactivity to the environmental pathogen. Until now, researchers have put most of their efforts into the search for connections between genes and disorders, whereas the search is only beginning for connections between genes and pathogen responsiveness.
It is thanks to that kind of exploration of the causal relationship that variables in quantitative studies become difference makers. In their study, Caspi and Moffitt reinforce the idea that a stressful environment moderates the effect of the 5-HTT gene in human species; they reinforce the hypothesis of the existence of a developmental G 9 E interaction but they do not actually prove it. In that study, the variables are actual difference-makers but not because of the result of the study, because it has been demonstrated by other interventionist studies before. So, the ''developmental significance'' of these variables is not potential anymore. The big merit of their research is to go further in the statistical approaches of studying complex causal networks.
To summarize:
(1) Biometrics regards variation in population and develops statistical approaches to study this variation; (2) Developmental studies are more interested in individual development and thanks to interventionist approaches, correlation may become causation; (3) Quantitative studies may then use variables that are difference-making to pursue their research, as was done in the previous study on depression.
So the fact that biometricians suggest that correlated variables might be actual difference makers is enough to justify the complementarity of their approach with developmental ambitions. The correlation is informative from a developmental point of view because it suggests the possible existence of a causal link between the variable and the outcome. Biometric studies suggest the existence of a cause (gene or G 9 E interaction or environmental factor) for variations at the population level, and the developmental tradition seeks to identify it at the individual level. Interventionist research studies need prior statistical studies for the purpose of guiding their own research. Therefore the developmental tradition cannot blame the biometric tradition for not being interested in development; it is simply not its goal.
3 Nevertheless biometricians should recognize the limits of their results-inherent in their methods-and not claim to provide more causal significance than they actually do. As a consequence, even though the biometric and developmental traditions are indeed two different levels of analysis, biometricians cannot claim the defenseby-distinction as they are not isolated from each other.
Moreover, in my point of view isolationist pluralism is not postgenomic pluralism as it refuses to interact. Indeed, the postgenomic era is the era of pluralism and I use the term ''pluralism'' to convey the fact that some phenomena observed in science require multiple explanations to account for their nature. Pluralism is a framework of interaction in which different groups show sufficient respect and tolerance to coexist and interact in a harmonious and non-confrontational way and are unwilling to assimilate. Tabery's, Griffiths's, or Rutter's will to overcome this opposition between biometric and development traditions is exemplary of the pluralistic perspectives of postgenomics. Different scientific traditions must show sufficient respect and tolerance to coexist and interact in a more harmonious than confrontational context.
Conclusions: Postgenomics, Pluralism and the Growth of Knowledge
Most quantitative studies concerning specific alleles in behavioral genetics-mostly published in the 1990s-have suffered from a lack of replication (Hamer 2002) in the genomic era. For Moffitt et al. it is perhaps because prior studies have not considered participants' stress histories. When environmental factors and personality are considered, the results tend to be more consistent and robust (Moffitt et al. 2005) . For example, Moffitt, Caspi, and their colleagues have notably shown that low self-esteem has significant predictive validity and may therefore be a factor that has a causal force in determining a part of the fate of individuals. Adolescents with low self-esteem are more likely to be sentenced for crime in adulthood, to undergo a major depression, anxiety, an addiction to tobacco, a premature departure from the school system, and a long period of unemployment (Trzesniewski et al. 2006 ).
The expectation that simple direct paths will be found from gene to disease has not proven markedly fruitful for complex psychiatric disorders; few linkage studies detect genes, many candidate gene-association studies fail consistent replication, and genes that replicate account for little variation in the phenotype. Several explanations have been invoked to explain failures to find psychiatric genes that replicate, including publication bias, misclassification of outcome, phenotypic heterogeneity, allelic heterogeneity, weak prior probabilities of association, multiple testing, population stratification, and inadequate sample size. Gene-environment interaction research is suggesting another reason. Ignoring nurture may have handicapped the field's ability to understand nature. (Moffitt et al. 2005, p. 478) Let me dare some general reflections. Each trait is caused by a complex network of causes in interaction and interconnection-as underlined in the developmental perspective. I think it might be logical that studying G 9 E interactions may produce more consistent-more replicated-studies as the complexity of the network is better taken into account. Moreover, I have shown that this reasoning is not limited to interactions. It is the same between any factors at any level of causality. The causal pattern includes molecular, cellular, cerebral, and environmental levels. Any study providing information on this pattern is virtually developmentally informative. It may concern alleles, proteins, hormones, neurons, environmental factors, or interactions between any of those factors. When a gene whose causal significance is suggested may be an actual difference maker, molecular quantitative genetics meets the developmental perspective. But as the contribution to the complexity of the causal pattern is low, the developmental significance is also lower than with G 9 E interactions and then, results of the experiments might be less robust. However, if the correlation is confirmed as the effect of causation, then there is a developmental significance-even if low-in the statistical study of a single gene by quantitative genetics.
So I think that the major merit of G 9 E interaction research studies is to progress in the statistical approaches to studying a complex causal network. And it is an important step for the growth of knowledge in genetics. The causal pattern of a trait is constructed step-by-step by research. Traditional quantitative genetics (the study of pedigrees, twins, and adoption), which represents human genetics in its infancy, does suggest the existence of unidentified genetic or environmental causes. Quantitative molecular genetics goes further and highlights correlations to specific alleles. Interventionist approaches (with animals, neuroscience studies) verify the causal significance of these correlations or risk factors. Then they are confirmed-or not-as the statistical reflection of causes (of variations or individual development). Variables in biometric studies may then become actual difference makers and these actual difference makers are simultaneously difference-making variables of regular mechanisms of development. And a step further is taken in the construction of the complex causal pattern by taking into account G 9 E interaction. Moffitt et al. (2005) make this clear with their seven strategic steps to carry out good research into measured G 9 E interaction. The first step implies consulting quantitative behavioral-genetic studies and the heritability coefficient, then identifying a candidate environmental pathogen (step 2), and optimizing environmental risk measurement (step 3). In step 4, researchers have to identify candidate susceptibility genes and make clear that the risk factor is an actual difference maker. The G 9 E interaction may then be tested (step 5) and a possible positive result be evaluated and checked thank to replications and metaanalysis (steps 6 and 7). The erratic record of association studies teaches the wisdom of awaiting the meta-analysis, while not overreacting to any single study, whether or not it replicates the original (Moffitt et al. 2005) . Moreover, results on G 9 E interactions are too crude to be answers by themselves, but they can be useful for basic neuroscience and for future gene hunting (Moffitt et al. 2005, p. 478) . This is a way the causal pattern of a trait is built, from the gene and the environmental factors highlighted by heritability studies to a multilevel pattern of multiple factors in interaction. The techniques and knowledge make progress in a gradual way and taking developmental complexity into account is clearly a progress.
So quantitative and developmental traditions are certainly different in their methods and their objectives, but they are not isolated. They participate together in the construction of the complete causal pattern of the trait studied. Quantitative genetics, molecular genetics, neuroscience, and bioinformatics must be in close association to be able to provide a causal scheme that is as complete and relevant as possible. Integrated research programs are becoming more numerous.
This echoes the idea of an integrative pluralism defended by the philosopher Mitchell (2003) . She underlines that the natural world is complex, and so our models should be as well. In part due to our cognitive limitations, and in part due to heuristic or pragmatic reasons, our representations of the world are arguably necessarily partial and idealized. The models are idealized and imperfect, and may or may not reflect all or most causal factors at work in generating some pattern or process. She defends an integrative perspective of pluralism where explanation becomes the place for the integration of diverse models. In a similar perspective, Longino (2006) emphasizes that the causal explanation may involve a population, a species, or an individual. It may be adaptive, contextual, or mechanical. The epistemologies of research programs are local and specific; each approach is characterized by questions, methods, and various assumptions. The issues are diverse and the structures of causal spaces that underlie the various explanatory approaches of behaviors differ too. But disciplines must be understood as complementary projects in that they offer different ways of understanding the same phenomenon.
Scientific pluralism in the postgenomic era far from being isolationist is rather a pragmatic pluralism. The use of the term ''pragmatic'' is relevant because the need for complementarities is made clear by the finite nature of each discipline's approaches. The limitation of their relevance is linked to the limits of their explanatory systems. So there is a pragmatic will to articulate different explanatory hypotheses and to overcome any useless opposition. Biometric and developmental researchers have to work together to complete the causal pattern of behavioral traits more and more; from correlation to causation and from isolated causes, to interacted and then entangled causes. That is the ambition of the postgenomic era. Sesardic N (2005) 
